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Major v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 70 (Aug. 28, 2014)1
FAMILY LAW: JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE RESTITUTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASE
Summary
In a child abuse case, where a family court has previously imposed an obligation on the
defendant for the costs of supporting a child placed in the care of social services, the Supreme
Court of Nevada determined the district court has jurisdiction to grant restitution to the State for
the cost of such child care but must be offset the restitution amount by the amount of the support
obligation imposed by the family court.
Background
Following Larry Major’s arrest for child abuse, the State placed his daughter in the
custody of Washoe County Social Services (Social Services). In a family court hearing, Major
was ordered to pay child support of $100.00 per month, directly to Social Services. Upon
Major’s guilty plea to one felony count of child abuse, Social Services sought restitution in the
amount of $20,362.07. Ida Peeks, a fiscal compliance officer for Social Services, testified to
establish the amount of restitution, based on the amount it charges other agencies for the care of
children placed in Kids Kottage, where Social Services housed Major’s Daughter. Peeks further
testified Social Services could receive reimbursement for the cost of care from the federal
government for children that meet certain eligibility requirements. However, Peeks did not know
whether Major’s daughter met these requirements, or if Social Services had received any
reimbursement for her care.
The district court concluded that the Family Court’s order did not affect the jurisdiction
of the district court as to its criminal restitution order, and ordered major to pay the full
restitution sought less $700 to reflect the amount already paid to Social Services.
Discussion
The district court had jurisdiction to order Major to pay restitution
Major argued the district court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay restitution because
the family court previously ordered him to pay $100.00 per month for the cost of the care. On an
issue of first appeal, the supreme court disagreed with Major’s characterization of the restitution
as “modifying or reviewing the family court’s support order.” The supreme court has previously
held “family court judges are district court judges with authority to preside over matters outside
the family court division’s jurisdiction.”2 Pursuant to NRS 176.033(1)(c), a sentencing court may
award restitution to the victims of a crime upon a criminal conviction. 3 Thus, despite the fact
district courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify actions of other district courts4, here, the
district court’s order imposing restitution did not constitute a review or modification of the
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family court’s support obligation. That is, although a family court judge has the same authority
as a district court judge, NRS 176.033(1)(c) limits the power of a district court judge to award
restitution to victims of crimes to the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding5.
Restitution is granted to compensate a victim for costs arising from a defendant’s
criminal act. 6 Although the circumstances in which the state may be considered a victim are
limited, the supreme court has previously held that the State was a victim for purposes of
awarding restitution when incurring costs for medical and foster care of a child after the
defendant was convicted of child abuse.7
Ultimately, the district court has jurisdiction to grant restitution to the state for the total
cost imposed on it as a result of Major’s criminal act, so long as the district court offsets the
restitution amount by the amount of the support obligation. In this case, the restitution amount of
$19,662.07 was proper, as the court deducted the $700.00 Major had paid under the family
court’s order, from the original restitution amount of $20,362.07.
Sufficient evidence supports the restitution award
Major argues in the alternative that the court should remand for a hearing to establish the
actual cost of care for his daughter. The district court found the evidence presented by Social
Services sufficient and required social services to notify the district court if they received a
reimbursement from the federal government, at which time, the district court would amend the
restitution order to reflect that reimbursement. Although the Supreme Court has cautioned
sentencing courts to “rely on reliable and accurate evidence in setting restitution,” a defendant is
not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing at sentencing.8 Therefore, “so long as the record does not
demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on
facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence”, the court will not interfere with
the sentencing imposed.9
Conclusion
NRS 176.033(1)(c) limits the power of a district court to grant restitution to the
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding10, thus, the district court was within its jurisdiction
when it granted restitution, offset by the amount paid under the family court’s order, to the State.
The court found the State to be a victim in this case, and further emphasized a defendant is not
entitled to a full evidentiary hearing at sentencing. As such, without evidence in the record of
prejudice resulting from consideration of improper information, the court will not interfere with
the sentence imposed by the district court. Therefore, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
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